What It Does
Remove long-lived secrets from code, images and configuration into brokered, rotated, audited storage.
Observable indicator. No decisive system authenticates with a static embedded secret.
Where It Sits
A technique is chosen from inside a form and emplaced on one layer. Both are the catalog’s own declarations; the position is counted in catalog order.
- Form of maneuverM2 Defense in DepthEnsure no single failure is decisive.
- Terrain layerT4 Applications and WorkloadsThe urban terrain. Key terrain: The public service portal, the case processing system, public APIs.
- Position in the form12 of 18M2 carries 18 cataloged techniques; this is the 12th in catalog order.
Phases It Is Employed In
Employed in one phase of the campaign. A phase named here means at least this technique is live in it — not that the form it belongs to is the main effort.
- Phase 0ShapeContinuous terrain preparation, zero-trust hardening, partnerships, threat intelligence.
Controls That Assess It
The controls the catalog names against this technique. They are what an assessor would test to establish that it is emplaced and working — the indicator above is what shows it is working, which is a different question.
- KT-2 Decisive Point Protection FloorKey Terrain and Decisive Points — To ensure designation produces protection, so that identifying a decisive point is an act with consequences rather than an annotation.
- SM-3 Implementation State TrackingScheme of Maneuver — To make the coverage figure reflect what is defending the estate rather than what is intended to, by weighting mitigation by implementation state.
- ID-2 Credential Strength and BindingIdentity Terrain — To ensure the credential is as strong as the access behind it, so that proofing and authentication assurance are matched rather than assumed.
In MITRE D3FEND
What this technique is called in MITRE’s countermeasure ontology. The join runs technique-to-technique: D3FEND catalogs countermeasures, and the thing with a countermeasure’s shape here is the technique, not the control.
- D3-CH Credential HardeningHarden tactic
- D3-CRO Credential RotationHarden tactic
- D3-CS Credential ScrubbingHarden tactic
- D3-ANCI Authentication Cache InvalidationEvict tactic
That a technique reaches a D3FEND countermeasure says the two describe the same defensive act. It does not say the countermeasure is deployed, configured, or working — that is an assessment finding about your estate, not a property of the framework.
Related Techniques
The catalog declares no relation for this entry, and no other entry names it — the inverse is derived here, so an incoming edge would show up even though this one never declared it. The techniques below share its assessment surface, which is the nearest adjacency the data supports.
Assessed Alongside
Not a declared relation: these are the techniques whose assessing controls overlap this one’s, ranked by how much of the two assessment surfaces coincide. Showing 6 of 33 that share at least one control.
- 2 shared controlsM3.07 Standing Privilege EliminationM3 Envelopment · T1 Identity
- KT-2
- SM-3
- 2 shared controlsM3.06 Machine and Service Identity GovernanceM3 Envelopment · T1 Identity
- ID-2
- SM-3
- 2 shared controlsM3.01 Phishing-Resistant AuthenticationM3 Envelopment · T1 Identity
- ID-2
- KT-2
- 2 shared controlsM3.10 Device-Bound CredentialsM3 Envelopment · T2 Devices
- ID-2
- KT-2
- 1 shared controlM11.02 Isolated Recovery EnvironmentM11 Reconstitution · T5 Data
- KT-2
- 1 shared controlM2.03 Crown-Jewel EnclaveM2 Defense in Depth · T5 Data
- KT-2