Control Statement
The organization shall identify on the terrain overlay the roles whose compromise would materially advance an adversary, and record the population holding each.
Purpose. To make the workforce positional, so that defensive effort concentrates on the roles an adversary would actually target.
Discussion
Identifying roles rather than individuals is what makes this terrain defensible without becoming personnel monitoring. A role is a standing property of the estate; the people in it change, and defending the role survives that change. Population size is the second half of the picture and is routinely omitted: a privileged role held by three named engineers can be defended by measures that are absurd for a role held by four hundred caseworkers, and a program that records only the role list will apply the wrong move to one or the other.
Goals and Metrics
A metric that cannot come out badly is not a metric. Each of these is capable of reporting that the control is not working.
- Number of identified roles and the population holding each
- Proportion of identified roles with a named accountable owner
Accountability
Exactly one role is accountable, and every other role carries at least Informed — no control in the published catalog leaves a role with zero relationship to it. That is a stated property of how these were authored, not a coincidence, and not a claim that every role's work is worth equal attention here.
| AO | CTI | SOC | HUNT | PLAT | ISSO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Authorizing Official / CISO: Accountable | Cyber Threat Intelligence cell: Consulted | SOC / Defensive Operations: Informed | Hunt team: Informed | Platform and product owners: Responsible | Governance / RMF / ISSO: Consulted |
AO Authorizing Official / CISOCTI Cyber Threat Intelligence cellSOC SOC / Defensive OperationsHUNT Hunt teamPLAT Platform and product ownersISSO Governance / RMF / ISSO
- AccountableAuthorizing Official / CISO
- ConsultedCyber Threat Intelligence cell
- InformedSOC / Defensive Operations
- InformedHunt team
- ResponsiblePlatform and product owners
- ConsultedGovernance / RMF / ISSO
Inputs and Outputs
Consumes
- TM-1 Terrain Inventory and OverlayTerrain overlay
- KT-1 Decisive Point IdentificationDecisive points whose operators constitute high-consequence roles
- Outside the frameworkHuman resources role and organizational data
Produces
- WF-2 Privileged Human RegisterRoles requiring a privileged human register entry
- WF-3 Role-Based ReadinessRoles requiring role-specific readiness
- FC-1 Facility Terrain IdentificationPersonnel populations informing facility identification
Activities
- L2Mark on the terrain overlay the roles whose compromise would materially advance an adversary.
- L2Record the population currently holding each marked role.
- L2Flag privileged roles that are unmarked.
- L3Define the marking criterion in terms of what an adversary gains, not in terms of seniority or job title.
- L3Include roles whose access is indirect — helpdesk, delegated administration, approval authorities, and contractor roles with equivalent reach.
- L3Record the accountable owner for each marked role, reconciled against terrain ownership (TM-7).
- L3Justify the exclusion of privileged roles that were considered and not marked, so the boundary is a recorded judgment.
- L4Trend population size per marked role; growth in a high-value role's population is an expansion of terrain that no asset inventory will report.
- L4Measure the interval between a role's creation or reclassification and its appearance on the overlay.
- L5Re-derive the marking criterion from roles actually targeted in engagements and in sector reporting, rather than from assumed adversary preference.
Measurement
Percentage of privileged roles marked or explicitly excluded with justification.
Trend in population size across marked high-value roles.
Evidence and Assessment
Workforce terrain section of the Brief; role-to-population record; exclusion justifications; ownership record.
Examine the marked roles against the privileged-access record; interview the accountable owner on why unmarked roles were excluded; test whether indirect-access roles were considered.
Related Guidance
- AT-2
- PS-2
- PM-12
- GV.RR-04
- ID.AM-03
Position in the Chain
Derived from the other controls’ own declarations, so the two directions cannot disagree.
Fed By
Nothing upstream — this control starts a chain.
Where This Control Is Used
Derived, in every case, from the declaration at the other end: the forms whose techniques name this control, the artifacts whose producing and consuming controls include it, the layers whose control lists name it, and the roles its own accountability chart puts to work. Nothing here is authored on this page, so the sheet cannot claim an edge the other end does not.
Forms of Maneuver It Assesses
- M1Screen / GuardGain early warning and buy reaction time before the adversary touches key terrain.1 of 15 techniques — M1.12
- M11ReconstitutionRestore the mission on evidence, not on hope — and prove it before you need it.1 of 11 techniques — M11.08
Terrain It Is Named On
- T7WorkforceWorkforce terrain identification is the control that puts this population on the overlay at all.
Artifacts It Stands On
- producesWorkforce terrain registerThe roles whose compromise is equivalent to compromising a decisive point — the operators of decisive points, and the roles with standing access to them.
- consumesCyber Terrain OverlayThe positional map of the estate: every element with a defensive layer, a defensive weight, a named accountable owner and its adjacencies. Not an asset inventory — an inventory enumerates, an overlay positions.
- consumesDecisive point registerThe elements whose control confers decisive advantage — each carrying the evidence that raised it above merely important, and the protection floor it owes as a result.
Roles It Puts to Work
- AccountableAuthorizing Official / CISOIntent, risk acceptance, and the scheme itself.
- ResponsiblePlatform and product ownersTheir own terrain. Obstacles get emplaced on their ground, so they site them.
- ConsultedCyber Threat Intelligence cellFrame, Map and Fuse. The intelligence requirements, the threat courses of action, and the confidence levels.
- ConsultedGovernance / RMF / ISSOTranslating cycle outputs into FISMA and RMF artifacts, and owning the rules of engagement.
- InformedSOC / Defensive OperationsManeuver. Executes fires and emplaces obstacles inside the standing rules of engagement.
- InformedHunt teamCounterattack. Works the hypotheses that Fuse raises.