Deception Coverage Measurement

What It Does

Measure what share of the data layer is actually seeded, and treat the unseeded remainder as a gap.

Observable indicator. Deception coverage is a reported number, not an impression.

Where It Sits

A technique is chosen from inside a form and emplaced on one layer. Both are the catalog’s own declarations; the position is counted in catalog order.

• Form of maneuverM5 AmbushTrade space for information and time, and impose cost.
• Terrain layerT5 DataThe objective. Key terrain: Sensitive mission records, PII stores, fee and financial data.
• Position in the form10 of 13M5 carries 13 cataloged techniques; this is the 10th in catalog order.

Phases It Is Employed In

Employed in 2 of the campaign’s six phases. A phase named here means at least this technique is live in it — not that the form it belongs to is the main effort.

• Phase 0ShapeContinuous terrain preparation, zero-trust hardening, partnerships, threat intelligence.
• Phase IDeterVisible hardening, a deception grid, and a stated attribution posture.

Controls That Assess It

The controls the catalog names against this technique. They are what an assessor would test to establish that it is emplaced and working — the indicator above is what shows it is working, which is a different question.

• CE-4 Coverage and Residual Risk ComputationCycle Execution and Assurance — To produce a posture figure that can be reproduced and challenged rather than asserted, so that the number carries authority beyond the tool that generated it.
• SM-6 Maneuver Effectiveness ValidationScheme of Maneuver — To replace assumed effectiveness with demonstrated effectiveness, so the coverage figure reflects what controls do rather than what was assumed of them.
• SM-7 Deception EmplacementScheme of Maneuver — To obtain detection with no false-positive budget, and to ensure that signal is acted on rather than queued.

In MITRE D3FEND

What this technique is called in MITRE’s countermeasure ontology. The join runs technique-to-technique: D3FEND catalogs countermeasures, and the thing with a countermeasure’s shape here is the technique, not the control.

• D3-DE Decoy EnvironmentDeceive tactic

That a technique reaches a D3FEND countermeasure says the two describe the same defensive act. It does not say the countermeasure is deployed, configured, or working — that is an assessment finding about your estate, not a property of the framework.

Related Techniques

The catalog declares no relation for this entry, and no other entry names it — the inverse is derived here, so an incoming edge would show up even though this one never declared it. The techniques below share its assessment surface, which is the nearest adjacency the data supports.

Assessed Alongside

Not a declared relation: these are the techniques whose assessing controls overlap this one’s, ranked by how much of the two assessment surfaces coincide. Showing 6 of 22 that share at least one control.

• 2 shared controlsM7.10 Purple-Team ValidationM7 Counterattack · TX Cross-Cutting
  • CE-4
  • SM-6
• 2 shared controlsM10.02 Avenue Closure VerificationM10 Exploitation & Pursuit · TX Cross-Cutting
  • CE-4
  • SM-6
• 1 shared controlM10.01 Indicator-to-Detection ConversionM10 Exploitation & Pursuit · TX Cross-Cutting
  • SM-6
• 1 shared controlM4.12 Denied-Path Register EnforcementM4 Obstacle / Canalization · T3 Networks
  • SM-6
• 1 shared controlM7.06 Build Pipeline Integrity HuntM7 Counterattack · T4 Applications and Workloads
  • SM-6
• 1 shared controlM7.09 Detection Engineering from HuntM7 Counterattack · TX Cross-Cutting
  • SM-6