Operational Technology Segregation

What It Does

Separate control-system networks from the enterprise with an enforced, inspectable boundary rather than a documented intention.

Observable indicator. No route exists from an office endpoint to a controller without transiting an enforcement point.

Where It Sits

A technique is chosen from inside a form and emplaced on one layer. Both are the catalog’s own declarations; the position is counted in catalog order.

• Form of maneuverM4 Obstacle / CanalizationForce the adversary onto ground you own and watch.
• Terrain layerT6 Operational TechnologyGround you cannot maneuver freely on. Key terrain: Building control systems, laboratory and facility instrumentation, engineering workstations.
• Position in the form13 of 17M4 carries 17 cataloged techniques; this is the 13th in catalog order.

Phases It Is Employed In

Employed in 2 of the campaign’s six phases. A phase named here means at least this technique is live in it — not that the form it belongs to is the main effort.

• Phase 0ShapeContinuous terrain preparation, zero-trust hardening, partnerships, threat intelligence.
• Phase IDeterVisible hardening, a deception grid, and a stated attribution posture.

Controls That Assess It

The controls the catalog names against this technique. They are what an assessor would test to establish that it is emplaced and working — the indicator above is what shows it is working, which is a different question.

• TM-4 Trust Zone DefinitionTerrain Management — To establish boundaries that something enforces, so that reachability and denied-path analysis rest on configuration rather than on design intent.
• KT-5 Barrier SufficiencyKey Terrain and Decisive Points — To make the barriers on which negative reachability results depend into named, owned, monitored controls, so that the assurance KT-4 provides cannot be silently withdrawn.
• FO-4 Operational Technology TerrainFederal Obligations — To stop operational technology being scored as though it were a server estate, and to make the connections between the two declarable.

In MITRE D3FEND

What this technique is called in MITRE’s countermeasure ontology. The join runs technique-to-technique: D3FEND catalogs countermeasures, and the thing with a countermeasure’s shape here is the technique, not the control.

• D3-NI Network IsolationIsolate tactic
• D3-BDI Broadcast Domain IsolationIsolate tactic
• D3-DNL Directional Network LinkIsolate tactic

That a technique reaches a D3FEND countermeasure says the two describe the same defensive act. It does not say the countermeasure is deployed, configured, or working — that is an assessment finding about your estate, not a property of the framework.

Related Techniques

The catalog declares no relation for this entry, and no other entry names it — the inverse is derived here, so an incoming edge would show up even though this one never declared it. The techniques below share its assessment surface, which is the nearest adjacency the data supports.

Assessed Alongside

Not a declared relation: these are the techniques whose assessing controls overlap this one’s, ranked by how much of the two assessment surfaces coincide. Showing 6 of 22 that share at least one control.

• 2 shared controlsM4.01 MicrosegmentationM4 Obstacle / Canalization · T3 Networks
  • KT-5
  • TM-4
• 2 shared controlsM4.14 Control Protocol ConstraintM4 Obstacle / Canalization · T6 Operational Technology
  • FO-4
  • KT-5
• 1 shared controlM2.01 Trust Zone ArchitectureM2 Defense in Depth · T3 Networks
  • TM-4
• 1 shared controlM2.04 Independent Control RedundancyM2 Defense in Depth · TX Cross-Cutting
  • KT-5
• 1 shared controlM2.10 Egress Data Loss PreventionM2 Defense in Depth · T5 Data
  • KT-5
• 1 shared controlM2.15 Safety Instrumented Layer IntegrityM2 Defense in Depth · T6 Operational Technology
  • FO-4