Application Allow-Listing

What It Does

Constrain what may execute on decisive endpoints to what is approved and signed.

Observable indicator. Unapproved executables do not run on decisive endpoints.

Where It Sits

A technique is chosen from inside a form and emplaced on one layer. Both are the catalog’s own declarations; the position is counted in catalog order.

• Form of maneuverM4 Obstacle / CanalizationForce the adversary onto ground you own and watch.
• Terrain layerT2 DevicesThe entry fords. Key terrain: Mission-staff laptops, contractor devices, the server and VM fleet.
• Position in the form5 of 17M4 carries 17 cataloged techniques; this is the 5th in catalog order.

Phases It Is Employed In

Employed in 2 of the campaign’s six phases. A phase named here means at least this technique is live in it — not that the form it belongs to is the main effort.

• Phase 0ShapeContinuous terrain preparation, zero-trust hardening, partnerships, threat intelligence.
• Phase IDeterVisible hardening, a deception grid, and a stated attribution posture.

Controls That Assess It

The controls the catalog names against this technique. They are what an assessor would test to establish that it is emplaced and working — the indicator above is what shows it is working, which is a different question.

• KT-2 Decisive Point Protection FloorKey Terrain and Decisive Points — To ensure designation produces protection, so that identifying a decisive point is an act with consequences rather than an annotation.
• TM-2 Defensive Layer ClassificationTerrain Management — To make posture summable and comparable by layer, and to force an explicit ownership decision for every element.
• DV-4 Execution ControlDevices Terrain — To deny the adversary the ability to run code on the ground they cross into, which is the cheapest point at which most engagements can be stopped.

In MITRE D3FEND

What this technique is called in MITRE’s countermeasure ontology. The join runs technique-to-technique: D3FEND catalogs countermeasures, and the thing with a countermeasure’s shape here is the technique, not the control.

• D3-SCF System Call FilteringIsolate tactic
• D3-ABPI Application-based Process IsolationIsolate tactic
• D3-EAL Executable AllowlistingIsolate tactic
• D3-EDL Executable DenylistingIsolate tactic

That a technique reaches a D3FEND countermeasure says the two describe the same defensive act. It does not say the countermeasure is deployed, configured, or working — that is an assessment finding about your estate, not a property of the framework.

Related Techniques

The catalog declares no relation for this entry, and no other entry names it — the inverse is derived here, so an incoming edge would show up even though this one never declared it. The techniques below share its assessment surface, which is the nearest adjacency the data supports.

Assessed Alongside

Not a declared relation: these are the techniques whose assessing controls overlap this one’s, ranked by how much of the two assessment surfaces coincide. Showing 6 of 30 that share at least one control.

• 2 shared controlsM3.05 Privileged Access WorkstationsM3 Envelopment · T2 Devices
  • KT-2
  • TM-2
• 2 shared controlsM4.09 Removable Media ControlM4 Obstacle / Canalization · T2 Devices
  • KT-2
  • TM-2
• 1 shared controlM11.02 Isolated Recovery EnvironmentM11 Reconstitution · T5 Data
  • KT-2
• 1 shared controlM2.03 Crown-Jewel EnclaveM2 Defense in Depth · T5 Data
  • KT-2
• 1 shared controlM2.04 Independent Control RedundancyM2 Defense in Depth · TX Cross-Cutting
  • KT-2
• 1 shared controlM2.07 Web Application ProtectionM2 Defense in Depth · T4 Applications and Workloads
  • KT-2